Posts

Supreme Court of Canada Decisions regarding Intellectual Property

It used to be that decades would go by without any Intellectual Property cases being considered by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).   The fact that there have been two significant SCC decisions on Intellectual Property within a period of 3 days at the end of June, is indicative of the importance of Intellectual Property in the new economy.

It is difficult to “police” the internet, due to the fact that the internet is worldwide and Court orders are unenforceable outside of the nation that granted them. On June 28, 2017 the SCC decided the Google Inc v. Equustek Solutions Inc. case.  In that case, Equustek (E) obtained an interim injunction prohibiting an infringer, D, from selling infringing products. D disappeared and, in a blatant breach of the injunction, continued sales over the internet.  A lower Court ordered that Google de-index the website of D from the search results on Google.  Google immediately complied, de-indexing the website of D from the Canadian search results available to Canadians through the Canadian default website, google.ca.   However, D continued its infringing activities and the website of D continued to be available on Google, except for google.ca.  E sought a Court order directing Google to de-index D’s websites from ALL Google search results worldwide and not just the Canadian search results.  Google resisted on the basis that the Canadian Court Order should not be given effect outside of Canada. The matter was appealed first to the British Columbia Court of Appeal and then to the SCC.

The SCC upheld the lower court order that required Google to de-index D’s website from search results worldwide, stating as follows:
“Where it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, a court can grant an injunction enjoining conduct anywhere in the world. The problem in this case is occurring online and globally. The Internet has no borders — its natural habitat is global. The only way to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its objective was to have it apply where Google operates — globally. If the injunction were restricted to Canada alone or to google.ca, the remedy would be deprived of its intended ability to prevent irreparable harm, since purchasers outside Canada could easily continue purchasing from D’s websites, and Canadian purchasers could find D’s websites even if those websites were de‑indexed on google.ca.”

“Google’s argument that a global injunction violates international comity because it is possible that the order could not have been obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, or that to comply with it would result in Google violating the laws of that jurisdiction, is theoretical. If Google has evidence that complying with such an injunction would require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, including interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the British Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly.”

A number of patents have been found to be “invalid” by lower Courts based on the so-called “Promise Doctrine”.   The Promise Doctrine created a higher threshold for utility based on the “promises” in the patent. Under the Promise Doctrine, where the specification of a patent does not promise a specific result, a “mere scintilla” of utility is sufficient; but where the specification sets out an explicit “promise,” utility will be measured against that promise. On June 30, 2017 the SCC decided the AstraZeneca Canada v. Apotex case.  A lower Court held that the AstraZeneca patent was invalid for lack of utility under the Promise Doctrine, as it promised more than it could provide. The matter was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and then to the SCC. AstraZeneca argued its patent was improperly invalidated on the basis of the Promise Doctrine.

In the result, the SCC found the Promise Doctrine to be unsound and characterized it as an interpretation of the utility requirement that is incongruent with both the words and the scheme of the Patent Act. The SCC held that the Promise Doctrine is excessively onerous in two ways: (1) it determines the standard of utility that is required of a patent by reference to the promises expressed in the patent; and (2) where there are multiple expressed promises of utility, it requires that all be fulfilled for a patent to be valid.  To determine whether a patent discloses an invention with sufficient utility, courts must first identify the subject matter of the invention. Second, courts must then ask whether that subject matter is useful, that is, whether it is capable of a practical purpose. The Act does not prescribe the degree of usefulness required, or that every potential use be realized. Therefore, a single use related to the nature of the subject matter is sufficient, and that utility must be established by either demonstration or sound prediction as of the filing date.

These decisions by the SCC are most welcome by the patent profession.  A patent holder no longer has to be concerned about an attack on the validity of the patent based upon the Promise Doctrine.  Should an infringer ignore a Court injunction obtained by the patent holder, steps can be taken to have companies that control search engines, such as Google, de-index the infringer’s website so that they no longer appear in the search results.

What is the significance of Posting Materials on the Internet?

The definition of the word “publication” in the Canadian Copyright Act is a follows:
2.2 (1) For the purposes of this Act, publication means
(a) in relation to works,
(i) making copies of a work available to the public,
(ii) the construction of an architectural work, and
(iii) the incorporation of an artistic work into an architectural work, and
(b) in relation to sound recordings, making copies of a sound recording available to the public,
but does not include
(c) the performance in public, or the communication to the public by telecommunication, of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or a sound recording, or
(d) the exhibition in public of an artistic work.

Section 77 of the Copyright Act has a provision allowing persons to obtain permission from the Copyright Board to use copyright materials, if the owners of the copyright materials cannot be located.  There have been two recent applications before the Copyright Board relating to materials that were posted on the Internet.  One application for permission to use related to a comment that was posted in a “Comments” section of an online news service.  The other related to a YouTube video.
After review, the Copyright Board was satisfied that the copyright owners were not locatable, and indicated that they would be prepared to grant permission in the form of a non-exclusive license, if the comment and the YouTube video were considered to be “published”.   However, neither the comment nor the YouTube video were intended to be downloaded.  The comment was merely viewable on the website of the news service and the YouTube video was intended to be streamed rather than downloaded.  The Copyright Board noted that under section 2.2 of the Copyright Act “publication” expressly does not include “communication to the public by telecommunication”.  The Copyright Board reached the conclusion that any materials posted on the internet (that are not intended to be downloadable) are merely communication to the public by telecommunication and thus are not “published” for the purposes of the Copyright Act.
I must confess that I have never had occasion to critically review the exceptions to “publication” contained in the definition of publication, until now.   Relying merely upon common sense, I assumed that if the entire world could view the copyright materials on the internet, that they were published.  I was wrong!
This finding by the Copyright Board potentially has significant implications.  There are many provisions in the Copyright Act that treat unpublished materials differently from published materials.   Materials that are merely posted to the Internet without the intention that they be downloaded are now considered to be unpublished materials. This will likely spawn further cases and commentary, which we will report to you as they are “communicated to the public by telecommunication”.

Use of Photographs

A number of years ago I was asked to rescue an advertising agency.  The advertising agency required a picture of a dancer for the advertising campaign for a large company.  The advertising agency had obtained clearance from the photographer, but had not paid any attention to the identity of the dancer in the picture.  For their purposes, it did not matter as long as a dancer was depicted.  It turned out that the dancer was famous and regularly charged a fee for endorsing any product or service.  All licensing of the dancer’s image was done through a licensing agency, which instructed a legal firm to contact the large company.  My client, the advertising agency, took the “high road” and undertook to bear the cost of rectifying their mistake.  I negotiated a licensing fee, which the advertising agency promptly paid.  However, they had learned a rather expensive lesson.  As I am a lawyer and the matter was settled out of court, in light of the duty of confidentiality that I owe my clients, I am unable to divulge the identity of my client, the identity of the large company, the name of the famous dancer or the settlement amount.

To be clear, it is not necessary for a person to be famous for him or her to have the right to demand a royalty or license fee for use of their image in advertising.  For example, under the British Columbia Privacy Act, it is a tort (meaning it is illegal) for a person to use the name or portrait of another for the purpose of advertising or promoting the sale of, or other trading in, property or services, unless that other, or a person entitled to consent on his or her behalf, consents to the use for that purpose.  Though, to be clear, a person is not liable to another for the use, for such  purposes, of his or her portrait in a picture of a group or gathering, unless the person complaining of the use of the picture is (a) identified by name or description, or his or her presence is emphasized, whether by the composition of the picture or otherwise, or (b) recognizable, and the person who used the picture, by using the picture, intended to exploit the plaintiff’s name or reputation.  Many other jurisdictions have similar laws.

The recent case of Saad v. Le Journal de Montreal, illustrates the more common issue with use of photographs or images, being infringement of copyright (rather than unauthorized use of a person’s image). Le Journal de Montreal was doing an article on a person and asked that she provide a photograph to be used along with the article.  Le Journal de Montreal did not pay attention to the identity of the photographer or ascertain ownership of copyright in the photograph.  The photographer sought compensation for the unauthorized use of the photograph.  Le Journal de Montreal first argued that they had no knowledge that their use of the photograph would constitute infringement.   The Court did not accept that argument as newspapers regularly have to deal with photographs and the photographers name was on the photograph.   Le Journal de Montreal then argued that they fit into an exception provided in the Copyright Act that allows use of a photograph as “fair dealing” for the purpose of news reporting.  The Court noted that in order to invoke the “fair dealing” exception Le Journal de Montreal would have had to acknowledge the source of the photograph by giving the photographers name.  Furthermore, the photo had nothing directly to do with the subject matter of the news article and, therefore, was not “for the purpose of news reporting”.  In the result the photographer was awarded $2000 plus costs.

Legal firms with experience in intellectual property, such as Thompson Cooper, are asked to address these type of issues relating to photographs relatively often.   Parties wishing to use a photographs of persons should be aware that proper authorization  may require  not only the consent of the copyright owner, but also, in some circumstances, the consent of the person who is the subject of the photograph.

CAT CHASES DOG (DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH PUBLICLY ACCUSING A COMPETITOR OF INFRINGEMENT)

A client called me the other day to discuss some steps he wished to take against a competitor who was infringing his patent.    The client wanted to write letters to some major companies that were purchasing product from the competitor, to make them aware of the infringement and advise them that he would be forced to sue them if they continued to purchase the competitor’s product.  The second step he wished to take was to place an advertisement in a magazine widely read in the industry, to inform companies in the industry of the alleged infringing activity by the competitor.  I advised my client that there were some practical reasons why taking these steps might end in disaster.   Firstly, when you threaten companies with legal action, they are not inclined to do business with you.  In other words, it is bad for business to sue customers.  Secondly, when you make statements tending to discredit the business of a competitor you are “potentially” breaching section 7 (a) of the Trademarks Act which reads:
“No person shall make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business, wares or services of a competitor.”
My client protested that everything he was going to place in the letters and the advertisement was absolutely true.    In the recent Federal Court case of Excalibre Oil Tools V. Advantage Products, a businessman with the same attitude as my client found out the hard way the risks of making statements about a competitor that turned out to be false.   Advantage sent letters to customers of Excalibre alleging infringement of three patents. However, when the patent infringement action subsequently proceeded to Court, Advantage Products lost; the Court found key claims to be invalid and the remaining valid claims not to be infringed by Excalibre.  The case is presently proceeding to the “damages” phase to determine the amount Advantage Products is going to have to pay as compensation to Excalibre for making false and misleading statements that discredited the business of Excalibre.   Why give your competitor grounds to counter-claim?  If you believe your competitor is infringing, communicate directly with the competitor and, if the matter remains unresolved, sue.

Internet Cases on Websites involved with “Scraping”

“Scraping” occurs when a business pulls commercial content from the websites of other businesses using web crawlers or other technologies, and then uses that commercial content for its own commercial purposes.
On April 13, 2017, a decision was rendered in the United States in the case of Craigslist, Inc v. RadPad Inc.  Craigslist alleged that RadPad had “scraped” thousands of Craigslist user postings.  It also alleged that RadPad had harvested user contact information to send spam in an effort to entice Craigslist users to switch to RadPad’s competing service. The Court awarded $60.5 million in damages, including:  $40 million based upon violations related to harvesting from 400,000 emails, $20.4 million for copyright infringement based upon “scraping” commercial content from the Craigslist website, and $160,000 for breach of contract as the scraping activities breached the terms of use for the Craiglist website.
On April 6, 2017, a decision was rendered in Canada in the case of Trader Corporation v. CarGurus.  Trader and CarGurus are competitors in the digital marketplace for new and used vehicles in Canada.  CarGurus “scraped” car dealership websites for photos of cars for sale.  Of the 197,740 photos that were obtained and used by CarGurus, Trader was able to prove that 152,532 of the photos had been taken by photographers paid by Trader.  CarGurus argued that, as the images were located on the car dealership servers and not on CarGurus server, CarGurus had not reproduced the photos but had merely “framed” them.  The Court found that CarGurus had made the photos available to the public for commercial purposes and rejected the suggestion that the photos had not been “reproduced” and rejected any “fair dealing” defence.
CarGurus then  argued that it was entitled to the benefit of section 41.27 of the Canadian Copyright Act, which is intended to protect search engines such as GOOGLE and which reads:
Injunctive relief only — providers of information location tools
41.27 (1) In any proceedings for infringement of copyright, the owner of the copyright in a work or other subject-matter is not entitled to any remedy other than an injunction against a provider of an information location tool that is found to have infringed copyright by making a reproduction of the work or other subject-matter or by communicating that reproduction to the public by telecommunication.
Conditions for application
(2) Subsection (1) applies only if the provider, in respect of the work or other subject-matter,
(a) makes and caches, or does any act similar to caching, the reproduction in an automated manner for the purpose of providing the information location tool;
(b) communicates that reproduction to the public by telecommunication for the purpose of providing the information that has been located by the information location tool;
(c) does not modify the reproduction, other than for technical reasons;
(d) complies with any conditions relating to the making or caching, or doing of any act similar to caching, of reproductions of the work or other subject-matter, or to the communication of the reproductions to the public by telecommunication, that were specified in a manner consistent with industry practice by whoever made the work or other subject-matter available through the Internet or another digital network and that lend themselves to automated reading and execution; and
(e) does not interfere with the use of technology that is lawful and consistent with industry practice in order to obtain data on the use of the work or other subject-matter.

Meaning of information location tool
(5) In this section, information location tool means any tool that makes it possible to locate information that is available through the Internet or another digital network.

The Court rejected this defense.  The Court found that the section did not afford protection to providers, like CarGurus, that gathered information on the internet and made it available to the public on the provider’s own website.  CarGurus was not acting as merely a search engine.

Having won the case, Traders sought “statutory damages”, the provisions of which read:
Statutory damages
38.1 (1) Subject to this section, a copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an award of statutory damages for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally,
(a) in a sum of not less than $500 and not more than $20,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all infringements involved in the proceedings for each work or other subject-matter, if the infringements are for commercial purposes.

If just the statutory minimum damages were granted, these damages would have amounted to $500.00 per photo x 152,532 photos owned by Trader for a total of $76,266,000.00.

However, the Judge felt that an award of $76,266,000 would be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the infringement and modified the award as a special case to $2 per photo x 152,532 photos owned by Trader for a total of $305,064.  In making this determination, the Judge applied section 38.1(3) of the Copyright Act, which reads:

Special case
(3) In awarding statutory damages under paragraph (1)(a) or subsection (2), the court may award, with respect to each work or other subject-matter, a lower amount than $500 or $200, as the case may be, that the court considers just, if
(a) either
(i) there is more than one work or other subject-matter in a single medium, or
(ii) the award relates only to one or more infringements under subsection 27(2.3); and
(b) the awarding of even the minimum amount referred to in that paragraph or that subsection would result in a total award that, in the court’s opinion, is grossly out of proportion to the infringement.

The factors that the Court considered in  deciding to treat this matter as a “special case” were the fact the CarGurus had not acted in bad faith and had, in fact, obtained a legal opinion that the conduct was permissible before engaging in the activity.  Unfortunately for CarGurus, the legal opinion was wrong because the lawyer involved incorrectly assumed that the photos belonged to the dealerships. Further, the Court felt that there was some bad faith on the part of Trader.  Although the parties had corresponded in an attempt to settle the dispute prior to litigation, Trader intentionally did not disclose the critical fact that Trader owned the photos until after litigation was commenced.

These cases will provide some guidance to those whose business model involves “scraping” content from the websites of others.

Video Games And Circumvention of Technological Protection Measures

In late 2012, the Canadian Copyright Act was amended to prohibit the circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs – e.g. digital locks). ,  The relevant section of the Act reads:
Definitions
41 The following definitions apply in this section and in sections 41.1 to 41.21.
circumvent means,
• (a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition technological protection measure, to descramble a scrambled work or decrypt an encrypted work or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the technological protection measure, unless it is done with the authority of the copyright owner; and
• (b) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition technological protection measure, to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the technological protection measure. (contourner)
technological protection measure means any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation,
• (a) controls access to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is authorized by the copyright owner; or
• (b) restricts the doing — with respect to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording — of any act referred to in section 3, 15 or 18 and any act for which remuneration is payable under section 19. (mesure technique de protection)
Prohibition
• 41.1 (1) No person shall
(a) circumvent a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition technological protection measure in section 41;
(b) offer services to the public or provide services if
 (i) the services are offered or provided primarily for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure,
 (ii) the uses or purposes of those services are not commercially significant other than when they are offered or provided for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure, or
 (iii) the person markets those services as being for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure or acts in concert with another person in order to market those services as being for those purposes; or
(c) manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide — including by selling or renting — any technology, device or component if
 (i) the technology, device or component is designed or produced primarily for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure,
 (ii) the uses or purposes of the technology, device or component are not commercially significant other than when it is used for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure, or
 (iii) the person markets the technology, device or component as being for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure or acts in concert with another person in order to market the technology, device or component as being for those purposes.

The Copyright Act sets out various exceptions that permit reproduction of works subject to copyright.  However, even the various exceptions that allow reproduction do not permit circumvention to make such reproduction.  A reproduction will only be permitted under the various exceptions if the person making the reproduction:
“in order to make the reproduction, did not circumvent, as defined in section 41, a technological protection measure, as defined in that section, or cause one to be circumvented”
The first court decision considering the circumvention of TPMs is Nintendo of America Inc v King et al.,  (Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd) a decision of the Federal Court of Canada, which issued in March 2017
Nintendo’s game consoles and game cartridges contain technological protection measures (TPM)  which are intended to prevent persons from using their game consoles with unauthorized copies of Nintendo game cartridges.   Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd sold “game copiers” that would mimic the function of Nintendo game cartridges so that they could be used on Nintendo’s game consoles.  Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd. sold “mod chips” that would enable the user to disable the TPM in order to use pirated game cartridges.
A first issue considered by the Federal Court was whether the Nintendo protection should be considered a TPM as contemplated by the Act. The court found that it was.

A second issue considered by the Court was whether Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd could claim protection under the exception that allows modifications for the purpose of compatibility, which reads:
Permitted acts
30.6 It is not an infringement of copyright in a computer program for a person who owns a copy of the computer program that is authorized by the owner of the copyright, or has a licence to use a copy of the computer program, to
• (a) reproduce the copy by adapting, modifying or converting it, or translating it into another computer language, if the person proves that the reproduced copy
(i) is essential for the compatibility of the computer program with a particular computer,
(ii) is solely for the person’s own use, and
(iii) was destroyed immediately after the person ceased to be the owner of the copy of the computer program or to have a licence to use it

The Federal Court found that the exception did not apply to these facts.

A third issue considered by the Court was, while Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd was facilitating copying, they were not actually infringing copyright themselves. Members of the public that used the Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd circumvention technologies were the actual infringers.  Upon a reading of the section, the Court found that Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd did not have to actually infringe copyright to be caught by section as “the uses or purposes of the technology, device or component are not commercially significant other than when it is used for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure”.

Nintendo sought statutory damages.  Section 38.1 of the Copyright Act, which allows a Court to award statutory damages reads:
Statutory damages
• 38.1 (1) Subject to this section, a copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an award of statutory damages for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally,
(a) in a sum of not less than $500 and not more than $20,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all infringements involved in the proceedings for each work or other subject-matter, if the infringements are for commercial purposes;

A fourth issue was how to apply the statutory damages calculation. The Court determined that it would base a statutory damages award upon the number of “works” (games) that Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd technology made illegally accessible.  Citing a need for deterrence the Court awarded the maximum amount of $20,000.00 per work (game).   The Go Cyber Shopping (2005) Ltd technology allowed access to 585 of Nintendo’s catalog of games.  The award, therefore, amounted to $20,000.00 x 585 for a total of $11,700,000.00.

In addition, Nintendo sought punitive damages to punish Go Cyber Shopping and further deter other would be infringers. The Court considered the disregard for Nintendo’s rights and the length of time Go Cyber Shopping had continued their activities and awarded a further $1,000,000 in punitive damages.

In summary, the award in the Nintendo Case totalling 12,700,000.00 should deter potential infringers and encourage game developers to include technological protection measures in their products.

Copyright, Design and Trademark – A Cautionary Tale

There is a relationship between copyright, design and trademark as they apply to physical products.  Copyright protects “works of artistic craftsmanship”.   Design protection can be obtained for features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament of useful articles.  Trademark rights may extend to the shaping of wares (products) with such unique shapes being referred to as “distinguishing guises”.  (The old-style glass bottle used by Coca Cola is a good example of a distinguishing guise trademark; the consumer knows what the product is merely from the container.)   It is possible for a product to be subject to all three, copyright, design and trademark at some time during the product’s life cycle.  However, copyright, design and trademark each have their limitations.

When an entrepreneur launches a new product, he or she does not know how successful the product may become.  Sometimes public apathy toward a new product is deflating.  At other times, the response exceeds even the entrepreneur’s expectations.  For that reason, it is not unusual for an entrepreneur to introduce a product into the marketplace and to wait and see how the product sells before seeking protection.

The Court decision rendered on December 14, 2016 in the case of Corocord Raumnetz v. Dynamo Industries is a cautionary tale that helps explain aspects of the relationship between copyright, design and trademark.  Corocord is a manufacturer of playground equipment. Some years ago, Corocord introduced into the market a new playground structure.  Under Canadian law, the playground structure was protected by copyright as a work of artistic craftsmanship at the time of introduction into the marketplace.  Copyright protection does not require any active steps to file paperwork with a government office, although there are advantages in doing so.

Fast forward ahead several years.  By that time, Corocord’s playground structure had become quite successful.  The law suit against Dynamo Industries was triggered when Dynamo introduced a similar product into the marketplace and they ended up bidding against each other on a contract for a playground installation. Corocord sued Dynamo.

Corocord tried to enforce their copyright against Dynamo.  Unfortunately for Corocord, copyright is only intended to protect “works of artistic craftsmanship” that are sold in limited quantities.  The right to sue Dynamo under copyright law was lost, due to the fact that the playground structure had been reproduced in quantities exceeding fifty (50).  Corocord had been too successful to continue to rely upon copyright.  Corocord could have sued Dynamo under design law.  Unfortunately for Corocord, an application must be filed with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office for design protection within 12 months of the playground structure being introduced into the marketplace.  The time had passed, Corocord had waited too long. Corocord tried to sue Dynamo under trademark law, which does not have a time deadline. In order to succeed Corocord had to establish that their playground structures had become so well known that the relevant market would automatically associate the distinctive shape of the playground structure with Corocord.  Unfortunately for Corocord, they had not, as yet, become successful to the extent that the distinctive shape of the playground structure was associated with them.

What could have or should have Corocord done?  It was okay for Corocord to rely upon copyright in the beginning.  Within 12 months Corocord knew that their playground structure was achieving success in the marketplace.  It was a fatal error of Corocord to not apply for design protection before the 12 months deadline for doing so expired.  With design protection, Corocord could have stopped similar products from entering the market.  Subsequently, when design protection was about to expire, they could have applied for trademark protection  in the hope of extending their protection indefinitely on the basis that the distinctive shape of the playground structure had become well know and is associated solely with Corocord.  However, now their ability to obtain trademark protection in future is doubtful.  The distinctive shape of the playground structure will no longer be associated solely with Corocord.  Dynamo is in the market providing playground structures with the same distinctive shape and other competitors may soon follow.